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I. Introduction 
This paper examines the role of structural change in productivity growth in Japan, focusing on her 
recent “lost decades”, with reference to the United States. As a matter of fact, Japan and the US have 
shown quite a contrasting performance in terms of aggregate productivity growth before and after 
the early 1990s (Figure 1). Jorgenson and Nomura (2007) states: Before 1990, “The rapid closing of 
3.7% per year in the US–Japan gap in GDP per capita during 1960–1990 was achieved by 2.1% 
annual growth in relative input per capita and 1.6% annual reduction in the TFP gap.” But, after 
1990, “Japanese total factor productivity, relative to the US, fell from 86.1 in 1990 to 81.7 in 2000 
and 79.5 in 2004, reflecting the sharp acceleration in US TFP growth after 1995 and the more 
modest recovery of Japanese TFP growth.” 
 
 
 
Naturally, a number of economists have tackled the issue from various points of view. Naming a 
few, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) is among those works from a macroeconomic perspective, 
Miyagawa (2003) from a resource reallocation perspective, and Fukao and Kwon (2005) from a 
microeconomic perspective. We would like to add something new to these lines of work by looking 
into the role of sectoral changes in the process of aggregate productivity growth with structural 
change. To this aim, we decompose labor productivity growth into both intra-industry labor 
productivity growth and inter-industry reallocation of employment, and then measure their relative 
contributions to aggregate productivity growth decade by decade. 
Rapid economic growth in postwar Japan accompanied large structural change, whose 
contribution through inter-industry reallocation of labor, we find, amounts to from one third to a half 
of that of intra-industry growth in the 1960s and 70s, which in themselves are exceptionally high. 
Now, in contrast, Japan is known to have a sharp slowdown in productivity growth in the 1990s and 
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Figure 1. Productivity Growth in Japan and US
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Note: LP: labor productivity, TFP: total factor productivity.
Source: adapted from Jorgenson and Nomura (2007), Table 2.
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her growth recovery is very modest even in the 2000s. Then, how does structural change contribute 
to the recent slowdown in productivity growth in Japan? While a slowdown in intra-industry 
productivity growth is the main cause of the aggregate productivity slowdown, we find that the 
contribution of inter-industry reallocation of employment becomes almost zero in the 1990s and 
even significantly negative in the 2000s. 
Interestingly, inter-industry reallocation is found to negatively contribute to recent productivity 
growth in the United States, too. Can we reconcile these seemingly contradicting facts with the two 
economies? We will argue that structural change or the lack of it may not be responsible for the lost 
decades in Japan, and that these contrasting outcomes come from common factors. 
  In the next section, we briefly discuss the background and the literature related to our theme. We 
introduce our simple analytical framework and the dataset to be used there in Section III. Section IV 
produces a basic result on aggregate labor productivity growth in postwar Japan, by decomposing it 
into intra-industry labor productivity growth and inter-industry reallocation of labor. We confirm 
changing patterns of inter-industry reallocation of labor across decades. In Section V, the 
inter-industry reallocation of labor is scrutinized further on. Discussing growth-reducing reallocation 
of labor under structural change, we show similar changes in the US and argue that the negative 
effect of the reallocation on productivity growth is unavoidable, but not very significant.  
Turning to intra-industry productivity growth, we examine relative contributions of individual 
industries to aggregate productivity growth in Section VI. We found some divergent contributions 
among industries over business cycles in Japan, i.e. cycle-robust industries such as manufacturing 
and transport and cycle-prone industries such as trade, finance and construction. While the former 
has remained to support aggregate productivity growth, the latter failed in the lost decades of Japan. 
In the recent US, both types of industries contributed to its aggregate productivity growth, generating 
the contrasting performance against Japan. Section VII concludes that long-term productivity growth 
inevitably accompanies structural change whose resource reallocation may or may not enhance 
growth, that business cycles affect sectors differently where structural change affects the pattern of 
cyclical impacts on aggregate productivity growth, and that, while we cannot deny the effect of 
inadequate structural change in Japan, its slower capital deepening and productivity growth suggest 
more importance of business cycle impacts as reasons for the lost decades. 
 
II. Background 
Industrialization accompanies productivity growth as well as structural change. In its early stage, 
labor and other resources shift from agriculture and other low-productivity traditional sectors into 
manufacturing and other high-productivity modern activities, resulting in overall productivity and 
per capita income growth. With the structural change, increasing allocative efficiency could help the 
economy grow even without productivity growth within sectors. “High-growth countries are 
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typically those that have experienced substantial growth-enhancing structural change.” (McMillan 
and Rodrik, 2011, p. 1) In fact, this was probably the case in Japan in the postwar rapid growth 
period of 1955-72.  
As early as in the 1960s, however, Baumol (1967) points out that labor shifts from industry to 
service along with productivity increase in industry, resulting in a decline in the aggregate 
productivity. Recently, Dennis and Ican (2008) shows that, in addition to this Baumol effect of 
sectoral productivity differentials, differentials of income elasticity of sectoral demand have also 
caused labor shift from agriculture to non-agriculture (the Engel effect) in the United States in the 
past two centuries. In the stage of post-industrialization, therefore, there is no a priori reason why 
structural change is growth-enhancing any more. There, resources shift toward non-manufacturing or 
services sectors, whose productivities may or may not higher than those of manufacturing sectors.  
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) claim that Japan’s prolonged stagnation in the 1990s has been mainly 
due to supply side factors such as declining labor supply and lowering TFP growth. TFP growth, 
however, is generally dependent on how it is defined and measured, because it is basically a residual. 
Differentiation of quality of labor and capital is known to reduce TFP growth, for instance. In fact, 
TFP growth is also known to include not only pure technological progress, but also reallocation 
effects of resources. Miyagawa (2003) found that labor reallocation among sectors contributed to the 
slowdown of labor productivity growth in the 1990s in Japan. 
Nevertheless, most of empirical studies on productivity growth in Japan have found a significant 
decline in TFP growth in the 1990s and its prolonged stagnation since then. By contrast, the US has 
eventually come out of productivity stagnation since the 1990s, by way of the ICT revolution. There 
are evidences that show the contribution of ICT capital deepening to the recovery of aggregate TFP 
growth of the US (including Jorgenson and Nomura (2007)).1 
We are not certain, however, whether these changes in productivity growth come from supply 
(technology) shocks or demand shocks (business cycles). Structural change and resource reallocation 
along with it may generate long-term slowdown of productivity growth under post-industrialization 
cum globalization. Recession tends to generate labor hoarding and to lower capital utilization, both 
of which tend to lead to a slowdown of TFP growth.  
On top of this above, remember that aggregate productivity growth is simply a weighted average 
of productivity growth in the industry level. Productivity growth of industries, as will be shown, 
significantly differs from each other as well as over time along with their changing weights. Which 
industry contributes to aggregate productivity most and when? How resources are reallocated among 
                                                  
1 Gordon (2000, 2012) has been skeptical about the longevity of ICT impacts on US productivity growth. In fact, we 
observe from Jorgenson and Nomura (2007) that TFP growth in IT-manufacturing showed non-negligible slowdown 
(contribution to aggregate TFP by mere 0.04%) in the period of 2000-04 in comparison with the previous two 5-year 
periods (0.27% and 0.48%). Bosworth and Triplett (2007), however, argue that robust productivity growth in 
non-manufacturing in the recent US is more broadly based than only ICT-manufacturing. 
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industries under structural change? These whole pictures end up with aggregate productivity growth. 
Now, let us start our scrutiny by introducing our methodology and dataset.  
 
 
III. Methodology and Dataset  
  Labor productivity growth in the postwar Japan 
  According to our calculation (to be shown by Table 1), labor productivity growth across decades 
in Japan, defining labor productivity as value added per worker, shows the very rapid growth of 9.8 
percent a year in the rapid growth period of 1955-69, which was halved to 4.2 percent in the 1970s 
and further reduced to 3.3 percent in the 1980s. Then, the growth dipped further into only 0.9 
percent a year in the 1990s and barely recovered to 1.2 percent in the 2000s (2000-2008). In sum, 
after the rapid growth period of the 1960s, the labor productivity growth dropped sharply from the 
1970-80s to the recent decades. 
Methodology 
  We now decompose the labor productivity growth into intra-industry productivity growth and 
inter-industry reallocation of labor. An increase (decrease) in labor share in higher (lower) 
productivity sectors increases (decreases) the aggregate labor productivity of the economy as a 
whole.  
Industry i’s intra-industry labor productivity in period t, yi,t, is defined as: 
ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ௜ܻ,௧ܮ௜,௧ 
where Y and L are value added and employment of the industry, respectively. Industry i’s labor share 
at t, θi,t , is defined as 
ߠ௜,௧ ൌ ܮ௜,௧ܮ௧  
Then, the aggregate labor productivity in period t,yt, is expressed as a total sum of intra-industry 
productivity multiplied by labor shares, i.e. 
ݕ௧ ൌ෍ߠ௜,௧ݕ௜,௧
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Now, we can decompose the aggregate labor productivity change into an intra-industry productivity  
change and an inter-industry reallocation of labor as: 
∆ݕ௧ ൌ෍ߠ௜,௧ି௞∆ݕ௜,௧ ൅෍∆ߠ௜,௧ݕ௜,௧
௡
௜ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
By dividing both sides by the labor productivity in period t-k, we obtain the following expression in 
growth terms: 
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                        ∆௬೟௬೟షೖ ൌ ∑ ߠ௜,௧ି௞
∆௬೔,೟
௬೔,೟షೖ
௬೔,೟షೖ
௬೟షೖ
௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ∆ߠ௜,௧௡௜ୀଵ ௬೔,೟௬೟
௬೟
௬೟షೖ        (1) 
where the first term in the right-hand side represents the effect of intra-industry productivity growth  
and the second term represents the effect of inter-industry reallocation of labor on the aggregate 
productivity growth, both between periods t-k and t.. 
Data 
Our data on Japan consists of sectoral and aggregate real GDP and employment for the period of 
1955 to 2008 (source: Cabinet Office, Japan). The GDP data for the periods of 1955-69, 1970-89 and 
1990-2008 are at 1985, 1990 and 2000 constant prices, respectively. The data covers 12 sectors, i.e. 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, utilities, trade, finance, real estate, transport and 
communication, services, government and nonprofit. For the labor productivity, we use only real 
GDP per worker instead of real GDP per (man-)hour, mainly because sectoral labor hours are readily 
available only after 1990 and partly because sectoral labor hours reported may not be very reliable. 
As to parallel data on the US, we use sectoral and aggregate value added, chain-type price indices 
for value added (2005 = 100) and the number of full-time and half-time employees for the period of 
1950 to 2008 (source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). The data covers 16 sectors, i.e. agriculture, 
mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, transport, information, 
finance, business service, education, arts, other services, and government. For comparability to the 
Japanese data, we consolidate wholesale and retail trade into trade and business services, education, 
arts and other services into services. For comparability reasons, as the labor productivity, we use 
value added per worker instead of value added per (man-)hour, the latter of which is usually used in 
the US literature.  
 
 
IV. Intra-Industry Productivity Growth vs. Inter-Industry Reallocation of Labor 
  Based on Equation (1) above, Table 1 shows the result of decomposition of aggregate labor 
productivity growth into intra-industry productivity growth and inter-industry reallocation of labor. 
The labor productivity growth in the 1960s (1955-69) is as high as 9.8 percent a year, to which the 
intra-industry growth contributes by 6.3 percent and the inter-industry reallocation by 3.1 percent. 
Then, the 1970s and 1980s experience more mediocre performances of aggregate productivity 
growth of 3.1 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively. While both intra-industry productivity growth 
and inter-industry reallocation positively contribute to the aggregate productivity growth, the 
contribution of the reallocation declined from 1.1 percent to 0.5 percent across decades. 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
Table 1. Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth: Japan 
Period 
aggregate labor 
productivity 
intra-industry 
productivity 
inter-industry 
reallocation 
1955-69 9.76 6.27 3.49
1970-79 4.15 3.10 1.05
1980-89 3.26 2.73 0.53
1990-99 0.88 0.87 0.02
2000-08 1.16 1.49 -0.29
Source: Authors' calculation with 12 industries. 
 
  Things changed downward sharply in the 1990s, i.e. the “lost decade.” The labor productivity 
growth fell to 0.9 percent a year, when the intra-industry productivity growth contributes by 0.9 
percent and the inter-industry reallocation by almost nil. The 2000s (2000-2008) witnesses slight 
recovery of the aggregate productivity growth as 1.2 percent, of which the intra-industry growth 
contributes by 1.5 percent and the labor reallocation by -0.3 percent.  
  Table 2 reports the result of simple regression of labor share changes on relative labor 
productivities, which shows significantly positive correlation between the two in the 1960s and 70s, 
insignificant correlation in the 1980s and 90s, and then significantly negative correlation in the 
2000s. That is, labor tended to shift from lower to higher productivity sectors in the 1960s and 70s, 
but the trend ceased to exist in the 1980s and 90s and the labor shift reversed from higher to lower 
productivity sectors in the 2000s. 
 
Table 2. Labor Reallocation and Relative Productivity: Japan 
(Dependent variable: changes in employment share weighted by employment share) 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Constant 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (t-Statistic) 0.385 -0.035 0.466 -0.162 -0.134 
Relative Productivity 0.165 0.034 0.012 -0.045 -0.091 
 (t-Statistic)   3.797**  2.130* 0.756 -1.396   -3.896**
Observations 12 12 12 12 12 
R-squared 0.590 0.312 0.054 0.163 0.603 
Relative productivity weighted by employment share.  
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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  Figure 2 demonstrates this sea change in inter-industry reallocation of labor. The 1960s witnessed 
industries with increased labor share and higher relative productivity plotted in the first quadrant of 
the figure, whilst the 2000s see industries with higher productivity in the second quadrant, implying 
their employment shrinking. In terms of employment size, in 1980, the largest was manufacturing 
(24%) and then followed by trade (18%), services (16%), agriculture (13%), construction (10%), 
government (7%), transport and communication (6%) and finance (3%). In fact, since the 1980s, the 
services industry is the only industry whose labor share is increasing. 
 
 
 
 
V. Inter-Industry Reallocation of Labor 
  A simplistic view may suggest labor shifts toward sectors with higher productivity growth would 
enhance aggregate productivity growth. Actually “structural reformists” may claim that some 
structural policies such as those for more flexible labor markets for more efficient reallocation are 
needed to cope against the above trend or that the trend itself is the result of structural problems 
inherent in Japan that hamper the shift of labor and other resources to sectors with higher 
productivity growth . In fact, negative contributions through inter-industry labor reallocation to the 
aggregate productivity growth come from mainly from manufacturing in both the 1990s (-0.4%) and 
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the 2000s (-0.3%), whereas from agriculture and finance in the 1980s and from construction, trade 
and government to a lesser extent.  
  Is it reasonable, however, to presume that sectors with higher productivity growth should absorb 
larger labor and other resource factors just like in the rapid growth period of Japan? Looking back at 
the later stage of industrialization or the post-industrialization of advanced economies, we have 
witnessed in common that the leading industry in terms of value added and labor is switched from 
the manufacturing sector to the services sector probably due to structural shifts in aggregate demand 
as well as “industrial disbundling”, where some parts of the manufacturing sector are externalized 
into non-manufacturing sectors such as business services. 
  To confirm this general trend of structural changes in industries, we apply the same 
decomposition of labor productivity growth to the case of the United States. The result is shown in 
Table 3. In comparison with Japan, the US shows rather stable (though lower) productivity growth 
across the past decades. As is well known, relatively poor performance can be identified during the 
1970s and the 80s, but the productivity growth recovered since the 1990s. More interesting here is 
the role of inter-industry labor reallocation. It contributed positively to the aggregate productivity 
growth until the 1970s, but then negatively since the 1980s, whose effects appear increasing.2  
 
Table 3. Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth: US 
Period 
aggregate labor 
productivity 
intra-industry 
productivity 
inter-industry 
reallocation 
1950-59 2.19 1.95 0.24
1960-69 1.59 1.50 0.10
1970-79 0.82 0.31 0.51
1980-89 1.08 1.12 -0.04
1990-99 1.49 1.71 -0.23
2000-08 1.24 1.62 -0.38
Source: Authors' calculation with 16 industries. 
 
  Similar to Japan, manufacturing used to be the largest industry in terms of employment but kept 
shrinking (from 28% (1950) to 13% (2000) as a labor share), and once the second largest services 
industry has replaced manufacturing as the largest sector in employment (from 18% to 37%), while 
other major sectors such as construction (5%), trade (15%), finance (4%), transport and 
communication (6%) and government (17%), have remained almost the same in relative size. In fact, 
major negative contributions to the aggregate productivity growth come from mostly manufacturing 
                                                  
2 A simple regression of labor share changes on relative labor productivities revealed significantly positive 
correlation in the 1950s, 60s and 70s and then significantly negative correlation in the 2000s. 
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in the 2000s. 
  The upshot is, as Baumol (1967) suggested, that recent negative contributions from structural 
changes through inter-industry reallocation of labor are not very unique to Japan. The negative 
impact (-0.3% a year) is smaller than or at least comparable to that of the US (-0.4%). Of course, 
there might be room for structural reforms against structural impediments in factor markets or 
elsewhere to improve the productivity growth through reallocation of resources, but their potential 
effects should not be overemphasized. 
 
 
VI. Intra-Industry Productivity Growth 
  In the previous section, we discussed the effect of inter-industry reallocation of labor on aggregate 
productivity growth. Looking at Table 1, however, it is apparent that the major source of the 
significant slowdown of productivity growth in Japan is not inter-industry labor reallocation, but 
rather intra-industry productivity growth, as prior studies such as Fukao et al. (2012) had already 
pointed it out. Parallel figures of the US also confirm this. The recovery of the US productivity 
growth comes mainly from that of intra-industry productivity growth. 
  Our next question, therefore, is how so and why. Namely, in our analytical framework, which 
sector contributes to the significant slowdown of aggregate productivity growth and why it does in 
Japan? How contrasting is the recent Japanese case to the US case? 
  Look at Table 4, which shows the decomposition of contributions of intra-industry productivity 
growth into three elements across selected industries, i.e. intra-industry productivity growth, labor 
share and productivity level relative to the aggregate labor productivity. Note that these three 
elements correspond to the three components in the first term on the right hand side of Equation (1). 
As expected, in the 1990s and the 2000s, a major positive contribution comes from manufacturing 
by 0.5% and 0.8%, followed by the transport and communication industry by 0.1% and 0.2%, 
respectively. The trade sector also contributed by 0.3% in the 1990s, but lost steam in the 2000s.  
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Labor productivity growth of manufacturing is relatively as robust as 2.1% (1990s) and 3.6% 
(2000s), while that of the transport and communication industry is also almost comparable (2.0 – 
2.3%). The sizable decline in the aggregate productivity growth certainly does not come from the 
two industries. It resulted from stagnation in such industries as construction, trade and finance. Their 
labor productivity growth fell from 2.8% to -0.3% (construction), from 3.5% to 0.3% (trade), and 
from 9.8% to -0.3% (finance), respectively, during the 1990s and the 2000s, and their contribution to 
the aggregate productivity growth is -0.3% (1990s) as against +0.3% (1980s), 0.0 % (2000s) as 
against +0.4% (1980s), and 0.0% (2000s) as against 0.4% (1980s), respectively.  
Note that the services industry has never showed high productivity growth, nor large contribution 
to the aggregate productivity growth. Its productivity growth was 0.5% (1980s), -0.2% (1990s) and 
0.2% (2000s), and its contribution to the aggregate productivity growth is as modest as 0.07%, 
-0.04% and 0.04% in each decade. Apparently, the services industry is not responsible for the recent 
slowdown of the aggregate productivity growth. Also note that the three stagnating industries of 
construction, trade and finance are relatively dependent on domestic demand. In fact, trade and 
finance industries are relatively income elastic,3 while construction is heavily dependent on public 
expenditure, which has been depressed under the prolonged “lost decades”. 
Before drawing any implication for Japan from the analysis so far, let us now turn to the US case. 
We have seen in Table 3 that, as opposed to the slow recovery of the intra-industry productivity 
growth in the 2000s in Japan, the US witnessed fairly steady recovery of the intra-industry 
                                                  
3 The income elasticity of industry i is calculated as a ratio of real value-added growth of industry i to the aggregate 
economic growth during a decade. Those industries such as trade and finance have income elasticities higher than one 
in Japan.  
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productivity growth since the 1990s . Then, how is the recovery of the US productivity growth 
attained?  
Table 5 is the US counterpart to Table 4. Manufacturing, whose labor share kept decreasing to 
13% (2000s), has remained the major contributor of 0.4 - 0.7% a year to the aggregate productivity 
growth throughout the decades and its intra-industry labor productivity has become as high as 5% a 
year. Other contributing industries alternate across decades, though. Trade contributed to the 
aggregate productivity growth by 0.5% (1990s) and 0.2% (2000s), whose own productivity growth 
was 5.4% and 1.7% respectively. Transport and communication contributed by 0.2% (1990s) and 
0.5% (2000s) with its own productivity growth of 2.4% and 6.2% respectively.  
 
 
In addition to these relatively sizable industries, both finance and real estate industries contributed 
to the aggregate productivity growth by 0.1 – 0.2% in the 1990s and 2000s. Their own productivity 
growth suddenly improved as high as 1.2 to 2.3%, partly reflecting housing booms. Finally, services 
also contributed to the aggregate growth by 0.15% only for the 2000s without own productivity 
growth.  
Leading (cycle-robust) vs. stagnating (cycle-prone) industries 
Figure 3 helps us grasp a overall picture of changes in industry contributions to aggregate 
productivity growth and their contrast between Japan and the US. In both economies, manufacturing 
has remained a major contributor, and then transport and communication followed, the latter of 
which is more significant in the 2000s in the US. Both industries appear relatively robust against 
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cyclical ups and downs both in Japan and the US in common. 
 
 
 
  Contributions by trade and finance industries demonstrate quite contrasting results between the 
two economies. They used to be major productivity contributors next to manufacturing in Japan, but 
finance ceased to be so in the 1990s and then trade followed in the 2000s. In contrast, both trade and 
finance remained significant productivity contributors together with transport and communication, 
and real estate in the US in both the 1990s and 2000s. As pointed out before, this contrast reflects 
contrasting cyclical phases between the two economies in the recent periods. 
  An additional evidence for the role of contrasting cyclical phases can be found in Figure 4, where 
labor productivity growth is decomposed into capital deepening and TFP growth, using estimates by 
Jorgenson and Nomura (2007). Since the 1990s, stagnated TFP growth and slower capital deepening 
go hand in hand with each other in Japan, while TFP growth recovery and active capital deepening 
go together in the US. Cyclical downturn would discourage capital deepening. While capital 
deepening is not a sufficient condition to generate TFP growth as the US experience in the 1970s and 
80s shows, it would be a necessary condition for TFP growth, and then labor productivity growth. 
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VII. Concluding Remarks: It’s not structural change, but domestic demand 
In the previous sections we scrutinized how individual intra-industry productivity growth 
contributes to the aggregate productivity growth in Japan in comparison with the United States. 
Although the two cases at first hand appear very contrasting, we can identify some common factors 
from the above observation with respect to developments of aggregate productivity growth. 
Structural change: labor reallocation is growth-reducing 
First, the pattern of inter-industry reallocation of labor in the post-industrialization period is very 
contrasting to that in the early stage of industrialization in Japan. In the former case, along with the 
changing aggregate demand structure, labor tends to shift from manufacturing to non-manufacturing 
industries, which usually leads to dampen the aggregate productivity when manufacturing is of 
relatively higher productivity. Discussing growth-reducing reallocation of labor under structural 
change, we showed similar changes in the US and argue that the negative effect of the reallocation 
on productivity growth is unavoidable, but not very significant.  
Given this “natural” pattern of structural changes, the negative contribution of inter-industry 
reallocation of labor is likely and inevitable. This is not to deny, however, that there is always a 
room for minimizing this negative impact on growth by more efficient reallocation of labor as well 
as more enhanced productivity of non-manufacturing. As to the magnitude of its growth-reducing 
effect, its contribution to aggregate productivity growth was -0.3% or one fifth of that of 
intra-industry productivity growth (1.5%) in the 2000s as we confirmed in Section IV. Thus, this 
negative effect on aggregate productivity growth is not dominant, but not insignificant, either.  
Cyclicality: non-negligible cyclical factors? 
  Second, both persistent stagnation and recovery of the aggregate productivity growth depend on 
business cycles closely. Examining relative contributions of individual industries to aggregate 
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productivity growth, we found some divergent contributions among industries over business cycles 
in Japan, i.e. relatively cycle-robust industries such as manufacturing and transport and cycle-prone 
industries such as trade, finance and construction. While the former has remained to support 
aggregate productivity growth, the latter failed in the lost decades of Japan. In the recent US, both 
types of industries contributed to its aggregate productivity growth, generating the contrasting 
performance against Japan.  
Positive contributions from income-elastic industries such as construction, trade, finance and real 
estate are indispensable to regain aggregate productivity growth natural to an individual economy. 
Somehow manufacturing and transport and communication industries turn out to be relatively robust 
against business cycles at least in terms of labor productivity both in Japan and the United States. 
The lost decades in Japan appear to have wiped out potential contributions to the aggregate 
productivity growth by those cycle-prone non-manufacturing industries as construction, trade and 
finance.4 
Sectoral productivity: inadequate reallocation of resources? slow capital deepening and slow 
TFP growth? 
  Third, we can find some interesting differences in intra-industry productivity growth by industry 
over time as well as across countries. As already pointed out, both manufacturing and transport and 
communication industries show steady productivity growth over business cycles in both countries, 
but their growth rates witness some divergence in the recent decades. The US has seen steady 
increases in productivity growth in both industries, which may suggest some room for Japan to 
narrow the gap.5 
  Booms and busts hit and will hit those industries as trade and finance, resulting in their 
productivity slowdown or their recovery, as is also pointed out. Their productivity growth, however, 
does not show any steady movements, so that it seems generally difficult to discuss their “natural” 
rates. While we cannot deny the effect of inadequate structural change in Japan, its slower capital 
deepening and productivity growth suggest more importance of business cycle impacts as reasons 
for the lost decades. Finally, as far as this industry classification goes, labor productivity growth in 
services is minimal in both countries to affect the aggregate productivity growth. Given this, 
enhancing its productivity seems to have little impact on the aggregate productivity growth. 
                                                  
4 Considering the contributions of income-elastic industries such as trade, finance, real estate and services to the 
aggregate productivity growth, the recovery of the US productivity growth may not be as robust as have been thought, 
especially when growth-depressing inter-industry structural changes are unavoidable. Bosworth and Triplett (2007) 
claim that the productivity growth in these industries are more broad based than just cyclical-prone. 
5 Jorgenson and Nomura (2007) points out that a decade of deflation depressed investment in IT equipment and 
software, leading to slower productivity growth in transport and communication industry in Japan. 
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